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Abstract
This thesis examines the U.S. Department of Justice leniency program setup involving both cor-
porate and individual leniency. Specifically, the interaction between corporate and individual
leniency programs in concurrent operation, the design of optimal leniency program structure to
elicit corporate leniency applications and the behaviour of economic agents subject to such pro-
grams comprise the primary directions of this thesis. In addressing corporate malfeasance under
the option to apply for leniency, the intra-firm interplay of agents is modeled as a dynamic game
of incomplete information. The principle findings are that if agents are symmetric in their access
to leniency the concurrent operation of corporate and individual leniency programs is suboptimal
as the presence of the individual leniency program detracts from corporate leniency applications
due to a reallocation of incentives to report. On the other hand, under asymmetric access it is in
fact optimal to utilise both leniency programs concurrently as there is no distortion in incentives to
report but rather a threat effect in motion. Agent access to these leniency programs is imperative
in determining the success of the combinatory policy structure.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mechanisms to combat illegal corporate activity have been a focal point in law
enforcement in the last few decades. For the most part, authorities have sought to
detect and put to end cartel activity which limits competition in the market. What
then is an appropriate mechanism to accomplish this? What of course makes
this question challenging is quite simply the nature of crime; it is difficult, al-
beit sometimes impossible to gather accurate information in these circumstances.
This lack of data translates to regulators and politicians championing one policy
arrangement over another based on perhaps ill conceived notions of effectiveness.
Alas, no one can claim to know the whole story when investigating illegalities,
however it is imperative that causality with respect to policy administration be
determined to the best of the regulators ability. Case in point, a popular medium
through which corporate crime, specifically cartel activity, has been fought are
leniency programs offered by the states authority on justice. The idea behind
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
leniency programs stems from plea bargaining whereby persons who have been
apprehended for a crime are offered the chance to exchange information for a
lesser sentence. Following this, the advent of leniency programs initialised with
corporate leniency programs that comprised amnesty in the case of after detection
information exchange which was then followed by justice authorities shifting the
focus instead to proliferating pre-detection spontaneous self-reports. The exact
structure of leniency programs and the level of amnesty granted naturally play a
significant role in generating these spontaneous self-reports which is the type of
policy administration this thesis is concerned with.
Targeting spontaneous self-reports admits two-fold reasoning and of course re-
structuring of the leniency program itself. Having a leniency program that en-
courages persons/firms engaged in criminal activity to self-report reduces detec-
tion/inspection costs of the authority responsible in addition to perhaps preempt-
ing illegal activity in the first instance. So there clearly exists a strong incentive
to determine the optimal policy setup to elicit spontaneous self-reports especially
given the usual case of limited resources for the justice authority.
In recent times, policies governing competition and antitrust have received al-
most complete revisal. Spagnolo (2008) gives a succinct review of the recent
evolution of leniency programs in the United States and European Union in addi-
tion to surveying the theoretical analyses conducted on said leniency programs.
Essentially, the achievements of U.S. leniency policies manifest in an unprece-
dented number of cartels currently being detected and successfully prosecuted,
which has prompted several other countries (including Australia) to adopt anal-
3ogous programs. These policies include both Corporate and Individual leniency
programs introduced in the mid 1990’s by the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ).
Following this, what served to instigate this research was in fact a bureaucratic
assertion by the now Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice, Scott Hammond, in which it was stated (see Hammond
(2004)):
The real value and measure of the Individual Leniency Program
is not in the number of individual applications we receive, but in
the number of corporate applications it generates. It works because
it acts as a watchdog to ensure that companies report the conduct
themselves.
The central aim of this thesis therefore is to ascertain through a formal model the
impact of having both corporate and individual leniency concurrently in operation
thereby ultimately either lending weight to the above claim or refuting it. In con-
ducting research into the validity of the assertion natural outcomes of interest are
the optimal policy structure of leniency programs to induce corporate reports as
well as the behaviour of economic agents subjected to these programs. When re-
ferred to, the optimality of leniency programs always concerns the success of the
programs in eliciting corporate self-reports with the optimal being the leniency
setup that maximises corporate self-reports in the class of leniency specifications
considered. Furthermore, this thesis primarily considers spontaneous self-reports
by agents rather than post-detection prosecution and exchange of information.
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The finding in this thesis is that the assertion above holds true conditional on
asymmetric agent access to the leniency programs within a firm. Specifically,
the bureaucratic conjecture requires that individual leniency be offered to only a
subset of a firm to generate a threat effect thereby inducing greater numbers of
corporate reports. If access is symmetric however, the conjecture ceases to hold
true but rather leads to a suboptimal outcome because an incentive effect rather
than a threat effect is dominant as agents simply weigh up the benefits of each
program and submit themselves under the more attractive one. In the symmetric
case, the presence of individual leniency actually detracts from corporate report
numbers. Pursuant to these results, it is found that if asymmetric access can not
be implemented then the optimal policy is to offer corporate leniency in isolation,
and if feasible, go as far as rewarding corporate self-reports. If on the other hand
access is asymmetric, then it is optimal to offer both corporate and individual
leniency concurrently if the objective is to elicit greater numbers of corporate
reports.
A consequence of these results is the need for authorities to refrain from util-
ising trends and other characteristics in historical data on face value to advise
policy construction but rather consider a formal model and more micro founded
approach to developing policies, with leniency programs and justice authorities
the subjects of this writing.
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents an
overview of the literature in the general subject area of leniency programs and
subsequently stakes the position this thesis will take up in the research void.
5Chapter 3 briefly lays out the leniency programs in question. Chapter 4 sets
out the model under symmetric access, the equilibrium concept and the general
solution to said model. Chapter 5 characterises the equilibria whilst Chapter 6
comprises comparative static analysis. Chapter 7 maps out the extension to asym-
metric access. The implications and supplemental discussion comprise Chapter
8 whilst concluding remarks are contained in Chapter 9.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Though closely related to the much renowned Prisoners Dilemma game in eco-
nomics, research concerning leniency programs and their impact on criminal be-
haviour did not exist until relatively recently. Throughout this diminutive time
period the literature concerning leniency policies has not had one direct approach
to modeling, though several facets of these models incorporate similar structure
brought about by necessity. For the most part models of oligopolistic competition
imbedded within a dynamic framework have served as the basis for the literature
concerning leniency programs with particular emphasis on cartel detection and
deterrence. As the vast majority of literature studies corporate leniency in isola-
tion, the following survey of literature is somewhat peripheral to this thesis.
Prior to the literature explicitly dealing with leniency programs, Kaplow and
Shavell (1994) were the first to analyse the crux of leniency programs which is the
self-reporting behaviour of culpable parties in law enforcement. Self-reporting is
6
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examined within a model of the control of harmful externalities through which the
optimal scheme is characterised. Kaplow and Shavell (1994) found that schemes
inclusive of self-reporting save enforcement resources because reporting avoids
the need for detection and that risk borne by reporting parties is reduced as sanc-
tions are certain rather than uncertain. Although an insightful analysis which
supports the potential benefits of eliciting self-reports from culpable parties the
study is a preliminary to the formal modeling of leniency programs.
The literature can be divided into those primarily concerned with ex-post deter-
rence, that of halting cartel activity after a cartel has formed, and those having
as their focus ex-ante deterrence, which is to say deterring cartel formation in
the first instance. The main concern of the literature early on was that of ex-post
deterrence.
2.1 Ex-Post Deterrence
Following Kaplow and Shavell (1994) the first paper to explicitly address le-
niency programs using a dynamic model structure was Motta and Polo (1999,
2003), where previous to this the literature focused on the related issue of plea-
bargaining and as mentioned self-reporting in lieu of leniency programs. In this
paper, leniency programs apply to cartels using a dynamic construction in which
firms interact repeatedly in an oligopoly and choose whether to collude or not
given the risk of being detected and prosecuted by an Antitrust Authority.
The Antitrust Authority is endowed with an exogenous budget, which it then
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commits to a certain enforcement policy. At the beginning of the game the au-
thority decides the policy parameters, which include leniency, the probability of
investigation and probability of prosecution. Introducing a leniency program en-
tails reduced fines for cartel members that provide information on said cartel.
Motta and Polo (1999, 2003) found leniency programs ineffective (even pro-
collusive), stipulating that if the Antitrust Authority has sufficient resources avail-
able to prevent collusion, inspections and full fines should be utilised. However,
when limited resources are considered, which of course is the practical case, le-
niency programs may in fact be warranted if they are equally applicable to in-
formation disclosure both before and after an investigation has begun in addition
to granting the same lenient treatment to all reporting firms irrespective of who
reports first. In essence, leniency programs are justified in the case of constrained
resources as a second-best policy when they are applied in an immensely flexible
manner. The conclusions of Motta and Polo (1999, 2003) are only applicable
to cases of ex-post deterrence however as they disregard the ex-ante deterrence
effects of leniency by focusing exclusively on post-detection reporting thereby
limiting the usefulness of leniency programs and possibly generating the nega-
tive result.
Further highlighting the negative repercussions of leniency programs Spagnolo
(2000b) also found that leniency programs may actually enforce collusive be-
haviour. Moderate leniency programs that either reduce or cancel sanctions for
price fixing firms that self-report may enforce collusion in one-shot competitive
games such as Bertrand oligopolies where in the absence of a leniency program
2.1. EX-POST DETERRENCE 9
collusion would otherwise be unsupportable. The essence of the argument re-
volves around the credible threat in the form of punishment strategies that le-
niency provides in order to prevent deviation from collusive agreements hence
sustaining collusion.
Though leniency is commonly examined in the context of cartels and collu-
sive behaviour, as somewhat a corollary to Spagnolo (2000b), Buccirossi and
Spagnolo (2006) applied leniency in the realms of corruption and drug dealing
amongst other forms of illegal activities and trade. Lending further weight to
Spagnolo (2000b), it was found that improperly setup leniency programs may
be highly counterproductive in that they may be utilised as a means to enforce
one-shot illegal transactions in addition to sustaining long-term illegal trade rela-
tionships.
Hinloopen (2002) investigated cartel members incentives to report under the Eu-
ropean construction of antitrust legislation. Casting doubt on the effectiveness of
leniency programs, he argued that the lower bound on fines for leniency to work
is unrealistically high in that it is very unlikely a cartel member prefers reporting
as opposed to sustaining the cartel agreement. Similar to previous literature, the
narrow focus of Hinloopen (2002) on ex-post reporting behaviour by failing to
incorporate a prior stage governing cartel formation in the model drives the main
result and discards the benefits of leniency programs on ex-ante deterrence.
Harrington (2008) focuses exclusively on corporate reports from cartels already
under investigation, as in Motta and Polo (1999, 2003). Drawing similarities
with both Motta and Polo (1999, 2003) and Spagnolo (2004) in focusing on post-
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detection reports and legal culpability for previous cartel activity respectively
the model is embedded in a dynamic oligopolistic framework with a stochastic
continuous probability of successful prosecution after detection. The reporting
behaviour of firms was found to be contingent on the realised probability of suc-
cessful prosecution whereby if this probability is high reports take place though
when low detected firms fair best not reporting. In addition, Harrington (2008)
showed the optimality of restricting leniency to the first reporting agent and that
in most instances maximal leniency is optimal however given the focus on post-
detection reports a limitation of the model is that inference can not be drawn on
spontaneous self-reporting behaviour of parties subject to leniency programs.
Whilst the literature at the onset of examining leniency programs for the most part
found them to be ineffective even to the extent of being pro-collusive, this out-
come is highly contingent on whether ex-ante or ex-post deterrence is the subject
in addition to focusing on either pre or post detection reporting. The literature
discussed above having focused on ex-post deterrence overwhelmingly conclude
corporate leniency as being ineffective though this narrow focus is precisely their
limitation in determining the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs.
2.2 Ex-Ante Deterrence
The conclusions of Motta and Polo (1999, 2003) and Spagnolo (2000b) directly
clashed with the views of several prominent academics and the U.S. Department
of Justice regarding the effectiveness of leniency programs in combating car-
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tels. Most notably Spagnolo (2000a) seemingly in an about-face and unsatisfied
with key assumptions in Motta and Polo (1999, 2003) sought to focus on the
positive direct effects of leniency programs neglected in Motta and Polo (1999,
2003); namely the ability of leniency programs to induce undetected wrongdo-
ers to spontaneously self-report and to prevent initial cartel formation by under-
mining trust between wrongdoers. Essentially Spagnolo (2000a) investigated the
merits of corporate leniency programs in inducing ex-ante deterrence.
Developing on the restricted focus to ex-post reporting behaviour, it follows that
the one dimensional analysis on post-detection prosecution in Motta and Polo
(1999, 2003) severely limited the potential of leniency programs beyond mak-
ing prosecution easier. In light of this, Spagnolo (2000a) deals explicitly with
deterrence and spontaneous self reports rather than on leniency in exchange for
information at the prosecution stage by restricting focus to leniency programs re-
served for firms that spontaneously report when their cartel has not been detected.
The key findings of Spagnolo (2000a) were that optimal leniency programs re-
strict full amnesty to the first party to report, programs which give rewards fi-
nanced by fines to the first reporting firm could completely deter cartels and that
programs that only reduce or cancel fines had limited deterrence effects.
Following revision, a critical and limiting assumption made in both Motta and
Polo (1999, 2003) and Spagnolo (2000a) whereby if a cartel member unilaterally
defects, they are immune from conviction for any previous cartel activities and
subsequently can not report on former partners was dispensed with in Spagnolo
(2004). Furthermore, the more recent paper extends consideration of rewards
12 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
and incorporates strategic risk alongside several punishment strategies (Motta
and Polo (1999, 2003) only consider grim trigger strategies) in order to maintain
collusive agreements. In both contrast and support of his previous studies, Spag-
nolo (2004) stipulates that it is in fact always optimal to have a leniency program,
even if it does not consist of rewards.
Ellis and Wilson (2002) analysed corporate leniency programs in the context of
Bertrand competition with differentiated products. They found the effect of le-
niency policy two-sided, whereby it can effectively prevent anti-competitive be-
haviour by inducing cartel members to report in order to damage competitors
and gain market advantage whilst also being utilised as a mechanism with which
cartels are enforced. Developing along similar lines as Ellis and Wilson (2002),
Hinloopen (2003) considered a dynamic model with time variable detection prob-
ability and found, as intuition would suggest, that leniency program effectiveness
markedly improves as the reduction in fine payments for reporting becomes more
generous and as the future period cartel detection probability increases. As noted
by Spagnolo (2008) however is that both Ellis and Wilson (2002) and Hinloopen
(2003) only consider two possible deviations from a cartel; undercutting the col-
lusive arrangement or self-reporting the cartel. Moreover, in both models the
optimal defection strategy is none of these two only considered but rather both
undercutting and reporting the cartel, which casts doubt on the robustness of their
results as it is unclear the ramifications if this were incorporated in their models.
In a contrasting study, Feess and Walzl (2004) provide an insightful comparison
of European and American corporate leniency programs. Specifically, they con-
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trast several differences in the implementation of leniency between the systems
including the restriction (respectively non-restriction) of leniency to the first re-
porting party as well as there being no (resp. a) threshold evidence amount before
being eligible for leniency in the U.S. (resp. European) setup. Optimal fines are
found to be increasing in the quantity of evidence given by other parties with
independence between evidentiary provisions of parties. Unlike the majority of
literature examining leniency programs, Feess and Walzl (2004) utilised a static
rather than dynamic framework thus there being uncertainty regarding the feasi-
bility of extending the implications to a dynamic setup.
In a comprehensive analysis of leniency programs, Aubert, Kovacic and Rey
(2006) investigated the deterrence effects of leniency programs by comparing
reduced fines and positive rewards to individuals. Rewarding individuals, inclu-
sive of employees within the firm, is argued to increase deterrence of collusion
through creation of an agency problem between firms and employees. However,
there exists the possibility of negative effects on firm structure and performance
in that reward and leniency schemes may deter productive cooperation, lead to an
inefficient reduction in employee turnover and alter incentives to innovate. These
points nevertheless are shown to either be trivial to deal with or useful in promot-
ing cartel deterrence and potentially increasing welfare. Additionally, the paper
addresses the observed retainment of cartel evidence by managers and finds that
reward programs increase the incentive to hold such evidence.
Chen and Harrington (2007) conducted a simulation study examining the de-
terrence effects of leniency programs. Utilising a dynamic Bertrand oligopoly
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model where the probability of detection and penalties are functions of firms
prices, their numerical analysis found that maximally generous leniency pro-
grams do act to deter cartels ex-ante, perturb cartels that have formed in the first
instance and dampen prices charged by said cartels. However, at moderate or par-
tial levels of leniency, much like Spagnolo (2000b) and Buccirossi and Spagnolo
(2006), they find the presence of leniency pro-collusive.
Clearly, the theoretical literature thus far has more or less been championed by
a select few with most having focused on the actions of Antitrust Authorities
with respect to optimal policy structure relating to corporate leniency and cartels.
Moreover, there is a distinct divergence regarding the effectiveness of leniency
programs, whether they are pro-collusive and under what conditions they are op-
timal in deterring collusive behaviour brought about mostly because of disparity
in the primary focus of the authors in considering either ex-post or ex-ante deter-
rence as well as pre or post detection reports.
2.3 Empirical and Experimental Studies
In a pioneering move Hamaguchi and Kawagoe (2005) conducted an experimen-
tal study which controlled for cartel size and the number of firms that are granted
amnesty under corporate leniency. The experiment results suggest that leniency
programs become more effective the larger the cartel but that altering the number
of parties in a cartel that are ultimately granted leniency (for example only the
first party to report) has no significant impact on the effectiveness of a leniency
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program. It is important to note however that Hamaguchi and Kawagoe (2005)
only consider ex-post reports as cartels are formed in an automatic collectively
exhaustive manner prior to the onset of the experiment rather than endowing par-
ticipants with the decision to collude.
Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) carried out a thorough examination of cartels
and leniency programs that lacked the drawback of Hamaguchi and Kawagoe
(2005) in that subjects of the experiment chose whether or not to engage in col-
lusion. Moreover, leniency was applied in a staggered manner whereby the first
reporting party received full leniency, the second to report received partial (half)
lenient treatment whilst the remaining parties received no amnesty. The experi-
ment affirmed the deterrence power of leniency programs as fewer cartels were
established in the first instance. In addition, the presence of the leniency program
dampened the collusive price charged and decreased the survival rate of cartels
that did form.
Finally, in an isolated empirical examination Brenner (2009) conducted an econo-
metric study of the 1996 European Union Leniency Program and found that
the program assisted with information acquisition from cartels regarding their
criminal conduct though had limited ex-ante deterrence effects. In addition, the
program sped up investigation and prosecution by approximately one and a half
years, however with respect to the ability of the leniency program in destabilising
the number and duration of detected cartels the analysis deemed the European
Union Leniency Program inadequate.
The empirical and experimental studies further support the inference drawn from
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the theoretical analyses in that leniency program effectiveness is conditional on
whether ex-post or ex-ante deterrence is modeled. As this thesis aims to analyse
the behaviour of economic agents given both corporate and individual leniency
programs are in operation, the above mentioned literature provide ample context
for leniency programs but are somewhat peripheral with respect to the principle
aims of this study. One paper however has concerned itself with analysing the
combination of corporate and individual leniency programs.
2.4 Corporate vs. Individual Leniency
Having drawn inspiration from the same source as this thesis, Festerling (2005)
explores interdependencies between corporate and individual leniency programs
within a duopoly model. An innovative aspect incorporated in this paper is the
partitioning of corporations into representing owners and operating managers
with potential conflict stemming from the presence of both corporate and indi-
vidual leniency.
Festerling (2005) makes the assumption that cartel activity is commenced only by
operating managers with owners made aware of these illegal activities only if the
Antitrust Authority opens an investigation or through internal sources by some
exogenous detection probability. If however this corporate partition of owners
and managers is abandoned then the underlying model roughly corresponds to
that of Motta and Polo (1999, 2003).
Contrary to Motta and Polo (1999, 2003) however is the designation of leniency
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to the first and only the first agent to come forward coupled with the reporting
agent receiving a complete fine reduction. The aim of the paper is to replicate the
setup of the U.S. leniency program in order to theoretically examine these key
features of the U.S. legal system.
Festerling (2005) found that while corporate and individual leniency programs
are offered concurrently, individual leniency applications are never observed.
However lending weight to bureaucratic contention, it is claimed that threats by
managers to apply for individual leniency may in fact move the owners to self re-
port under corporate leniency. On the other hand, the individual leniency program
may increase owners tolerance for cartel activity because the option to apply for
individual leniency by managers is pertinent only when owners move toward ter-
minating the cartel activity in progress, thereby creating a credible threat against
the owners who then permit managers to continue the cartel.
While Festerling (2005) moves away from the traditional viewing angle of le-
niency and incorporates a fruitful approach to modeling the internal dynamics of
firms within cartels, this thesis seeks to move further in this direction by explicitly
dealing with individual agent behaviour under both uncertainty and concurrently
operating leniency programs. Furthermore, the partitioning of the firm in Fes-
terling (2005) into owners and managers whilst innovative serves as a limitation
in that the supposed threat that individual leniency generates is somewhat me-
chanically inserted by said partitioning. This thesis seeks to formally model the
internal workings of the firm under as general a framework as possible, especially
espousing generality with respect to firm structure and agent characteristics.
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2.5 Synthesis
The literature thus far has focused for the most part on modeling leniency pro-
grams with specific interest in determining optimal leniency policy administra-
tion through analysing cartels. This thesis is primarily centered around the pro-
cess preceding self reports within a firm and so inter-firm competition for leniency
is not a relevant consideration but rather intra-firm competition. Essentially a for-
mal model is developed in order to account for and analyse the behaviour of
individual agents given two separate leniency programs are in concurrent opera-
tion yielding a somewhat more micro perspective. As stated earlier the focus on
combinatory leniency programs requires an entirely different modeling approach
to those before as corporate leniency was the sole interest previously.
Following Festerling (2005), it is assumed that leniency only applies to the first
to come forward to the regulatory authority. However in contrast, leniency is not
restricted to a particular concession, such as fine reduction, but rather some lesser
penalty where the penalty is generalised such that it could be anything ranging
from fines to prison sentences. Moreover, this thesis deals with ex-post deterrence
as the aim is to analyse the reporting behaviour of agents given concurrently
operating leniency programs (in effect to ascertain whether this threat effect of
individual leniency exists or not) and so the process prior to undertaking illegal
activity is taken as given. Hence, ex-ante deterrence is not of interest in this thesis
but rather the reporting behaviour of agents after illegal activity commences.
Therefore, this thesis departs from the traditional viewpoint in the field of le-
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niency by not specifically studying corporate leniency under cartels and by focus-
ing on individuals within firms instead of firms set in oligopolistic competition.
Furthermore, building upon Spagnolo (2000a) in his critique of Motta and Polo
(1999, 2003), the emphasis in this research is on spontaneous self reports rather
than post-detection prosecution and exchange of information.
Chapter 3
Institutional Requisites
In order to elicit a complete understanding of the model in this thesis, it is impera-
tive that leniency programs and the program designs be discussed before present-
ing the model underpinning this research. As stated previously, the principal in-
novator with respect to leniency program design is the United States Department
of Justice and so the program design is primarily drawn from the U.S. example.
The U.S. DoJ has currently on offer both corporate and individual leniency pro-
grams (since 1994) with certain conditions having to be met before leniency is
granted. In the realm of the U.S. DoJ, leniency translates to not charging the
firm/individual criminally, if their application is successful, for the activity be-
ing reported. In the context of this thesis, and the majority of prior literature in
the field, leniency is taken as a reduction in penalty for the successful applicant
whether it be fines, imprisonment or some other penalty that is synonymous with
the DoJ’s perspective. The following briefly outlines the structure of the leniency
20
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programs in question.
3.1 Corporate Leniency Program
The U.S. Department of Justice stipulates that leniency will be granted to a corpo-
ration reporting illegal activity before an investigation has begun, if the following
six conditions are met1:
1. At the time the corporation comes forward to report the illegal activity,
the Division has not received information about the illegal activity being
reported from any other source;
2. The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal activity being reported,
took prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the activity;
3. The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and
provides full, continuing and complete cooperation to the Division through-
out the investigation;
4. The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as opposed to iso-
lated confessions of individual executives or officials;
5. Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to injured parties; and
6. The corporation did not coerce another party to participate in the illegal
activity and clearly was not the leader in, or originator of, the activity.
1DoJ Corporate Leniency: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.htm
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In the ensuing model it will be assumed that a firm who applies for corporate
leniency automatically satisfies the above criteria. There do in fact exist alterna-
tive requirements for corporate leniency if a firm fails to meet all six conditions
above however this prospect is irrelevant for the considerations that follow given
the assumption of automatic compliance.
As per the DoJ, if a corporation qualifies for leniency, all personnel of the corpo-
ration who admit their involvement in the illegal activity as part of the corporate
confession will receive leniency.
An interesting condition, though not considered in this thesis, is that if a cor-
poration does not qualify for leniency, personnel who come forward with the
corporation will be considered for immunity from criminal prosecution on the
same basis as if they had approached the DoJ individually. For simplicity this
factor is not integrated in the model to come, done away with by the assumption
of automatic compliance.
3.2 Individual Leniency Program
The individual leniency program applies to all individuals who approach the DoJ
on their own behalf, not as part of a corporate confession, to seek leniency for
reporting illegal activity of which the department has not previously been made
aware. Leniency will be granted to an individual reporting illegal activity before
an investigation has begun, if the following three conditions are met2:
2DoJ Individual Leniency: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0092.htm
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1. At the time the individual comes forward to report the illegal activity, the
Division has not received information about the illegal activity being re-
ported from any other source;
2. The individual reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and
provides full, continuing and complete cooperation to the Division through-
out the investigation; and
3. The individual did not coerce another party to participate in the illegal ac-
tivity and clearly was not the leader in, or originator of, the activity.
Once again these conditions are assumed to be automatically satisfied when an
individual applies for leniency as a singleton in the model thereby discarding
administrative quandaries that may possibly accompany a leniency application.
Furthermore, observe that both the U.S. corporate and individual leniency pro-
grams restrict leniency to the first reporting party; a requisite carried through
in the forthcoming model. Having outlined the content of the relevant leniency
programs, attention can now turn to the model underpinning this thesis.
Chapter 4
The Model
4.1 Preliminaries
In order to study the behaviour of agents under both corporate and individual
leniency consider the following. There is a firm,F that has committed an illegal
act whereby each and every member of this firm is liable and knows it. There
is no need to specify any particular form of wrongdoing though it is common to
assume cartel activity. F is assumed a representative firm.
In addition, there exists an exogenous authority, A that imposes penalties on
firms and/or individuals for misdemeanour. In order to induce firms or agents
within these firms to come forward the authority has on offer both corporate (L C)
and individual leniency (L I) policies. Note that when the term leniency is used
it refers to both types.
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It is assumed the combination of policies is administered by the authority in the
following manner. If a firm comes forward as a group underL C, penalty of size
X is levied against everyone in the firm. However, if leniency is applied for under
L I only the first agent within the firm to come forward receives penalty of size
Y whilst the complement within the firm receive penalty of size Z.
Observation 1. The parameter X is maintained generally, which is to say that it
can take any value on the real number line at this point, specifically, X ∈R. Y and
Z however are restricted to be non-negative values, Y,Z ∈ R+ with the proviso
that X ,Y ≤ Z which is a reasonable assumption to make.
In what follows, though it may seem counter-intuitive at this point, when the
parameter X takes a negative value this corresponds to players that self-report
successfully underL C receiving a reward fromA with of course positive values
denoting a penalty being imposed. It is best to think of this from the point of
view ofA . The reader may take the parameters to denote fiscal quantities, which
is a natural interpretation, however this is not strictly necessary for the following
exposition.
In addition, let S be defined as the status quo payoff for a player each period the
illegal activity continues undetected by A , where in this model the only means
by which the authority is made aware of illegalities is by either firm or player self-
reports. Therefore, each player in F receives S each period the illegal activity
goes undetected.
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4.2 The Three Player/Two Period Case
The game is nested in a 2 period environment with t = 0,1. Since there are only
two periods in this game, for simplicity, discounting is ignored. The set of players
N = {1,2,3} are contained within the firm F . From the onset all players know
they are guilty of some crime which was carried out in the name of the firm.
This results in a whole firm vote in the first period to determine whether or not
the firm as a group should come forward to the authority under L C. The voting
mechanism yields a binary outcome, namely come forward as a group or not.
The agents within the firm are modeled such that each has a certain private cost
for bearing a penalty imposed by the regulatory authority.
Observation 2. A digression regarding the relationship between agent cost, re-
wards and penalties. The model deals with the cost of bearing a penalty because
if an agent has a low cost for penalties they reap (from their point of view) less
of the penalty relative to others with higher costs which works in their favour.
Nevertheless, they also take less out of the reward in relative terms because their
low cost would potentially allow them to sustain illegal activity in accordance
with their strong tolerance for possible penalties. A diametric argument applies
to those with high costs for bearing penalties. Therefore, scaling the penalty
parameters by the agents ‘cost’ works both ways.
The private cost of agent i is represented by a type ci whereby the possible set of
types for agent i is given by Ci = [c,c] for i= 1,2,3 with c≥ 0. Let C =C1×C2×
C3 of which a realisation is denoted c = (c1,c2,c3). Each agent i ∈ N knows her
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own cost and believes that the costs of others are distributed independently over
[c,c] according to a common cumulative distribution function F . Note that given
the support of the cost types it must that F(c) = 0 and F(c) = 1. Furthermore F
admits a continuous density function f .
Agent i is uncertain about the types of the other players, denoted by the vector
c−i = (c1, . . . ,ci−1,ci+1, . . . ,cn). In accordance with Harsanyi (1967) the game
is structured as follows. It is assumed at the beginning of the game that nature
draws a cost type vector c = (c1,c2,c3) where ci is drawn from Ci according to
the prior distribution F . Nature then reveals ci to agent i but not to any other
player.
Each agent must take part in a whole firm vote in the first period where agents
can vote either y or n and cast their votes anonymously in a simultaneous manner.
Intuitively, these correspond to a vote in favour of coming forward as a firm and
not coming forward as a firm respectively. Having described the voting procedure
for each agent, the overall outcome from the first period vote is determined by
majority ruling where the overall outcome of the first period vote is represented
by Y or N if the majority vote y or n respectively.
Contingent on the outcome in the first period vote, the game may progress to a
second period. The game ends after the first period if the majority vote y. The
second period is reached if the majority vote n whereby no vote is held but rather
agents can individually come forward to the regulatory authority underL I .
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4.2.1 The Second Period
Each agent i has two possible actions in the second period, come forward in-
dividually (‘fink’) or do not come forward individually. These actions are de-
noted r and d respectively. Actions are made simultaneously in the second period
with whoever coming forward individually first in the second period getting the
penalty Y with the others inF receiving Z. The probability of being first is given
by 1/k where k denotes the number agents who played r. In this model therefore,
every agent i ∈ N has two leniency options at hand, corporate and individual
leniency.
Definition 1. As agents are identical in their access to the leniency programs in
that they are able to report under either corporate and individual leniency, agent
access to leniency is deemed symmetric. Of course when agents are not identical
in their access to leniency this is termed asymmetric access.
In order to maintain notational simplicity, let 1 denote voting y at time t = 0
or playing r at t = 1. Similarly, let 0 denote voting n at t = 0 or playing d at
t = 1. Thus 1 represents reporting and 0 represents not reporting irrespective of
leniency program allowing each agent i’s action set in each period t = 0,1 to be
defined as Ai = {0,1}. From here on 1 and 0 are used interchangeably with y
and n respectively in discussion, though it is generally such that y and n are used
when discussing the first period vote explicitly.
Given this timeline there are five possible histories of the game for each agent,
with the set given by H = ( /0,h1,h2,h3,h4). Within this set, /0 is the (null) history
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in the first period, h1 = (1,Y),h2 = (1,N),h3 = (0,Y) and h4 = (0,N) where
h j(., .) is interpreted as containing the individual agents first period voting action
as well as the result from said vote, in that order.
The only two histories of relevance though are those of h2 and h4 since these
are the only elements in H that result in the second period being reached. In
light of this, let hy = h2 and hn = h4 from this point onwards with the subscript
representing the individual agents vote in the history.
Each agent i’s payoffs are best described in terms of the evolution of the game.
If the majority vote y in the first period, then the game ends and each agent re-
ceives payoff −Xci. If however the majority vote n, the second period is reached
and S accrues to each agent. Now agents decide whether to apply for individual
leniency or not. If there is at least one reporting agent let i∗ denote the agent to
report first under L I . Agent i∗’s payoff is S−Y ci whilst N \ i∗ receive payoff
S−Zci. If no agent chooses to report under L I then the game finishes and each
agent receives payoff 2S.
To complete the description of the model, an agents strategy in the first period
and subsequent period given the history of the game is a mapping from her type
space to action space. A strategy in the game consists of a tuple σ = (σ0,σy,σn)
such that σ j : [c,c] 7→ {0,1} for j = 0,y,n. The strategy space for each player is
hence defined as Ω= {σ | σ = (σ0,σy,σn)}.
Therefore, the foregoing exposition describes a Bayesian game which shall be
denoted by G .
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4.3 Equilibrium Concept
The equilibrium concept is Bayes Nash. It requires a strategy profile and be-
liefs be specified. In order to solve G , consider the equilibrium postulate σ∗ =
(σ∗0 ,σ
∗
y ,σ∗n ) such that
σ∗0 (c) =
 1 if c≥ c00 if c < c0 (4.1)
σ∗y (c) =
 1 if c≥ cy0 if c < cy (4.2)
σ∗n (c) =
 1 if c≥ cn0 if c < cn (4.3)
Note that c0 is defined as the cost type who is indifferent between playing 1 or
0 at time t = 0 with cy and cn representing the equivalent cost type expressing
indifference at time t = 1 following histories hy and hn respectively.
Moreover, players must hold beliefs over c−i. The beliefs that players hold over
the cost types of other players in the first period is given by the prior distribution
F . The second period beliefs are contingent on the history of the game. Specifi-
cally, let µy = µ(c−i | hy) and µn = µ(c−i | hn) denote these second period beliefs
which are derived through Bayesian updating.
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4.4 Solution
In order to proceed, several notational necessities must be defined and the game
illustrated.
Definition 2. Let qn denote the probability that a player will play 1 in the second
period having played 0 in the first. Similarly, let qy denote the probability that a
player plays 1 in the second period having played 1 in the first. The probabilities,
qn and qy provide the intertemporal probabilistic link between the first and second
period.
To illustrate the game in question and thus gain a stronger intuition for the expo-
sition, refer to Figure 4.1. The figure maps out the game, information sets and
nodes within which will help in understanding the next few sections.
Let us take the position of the first player who’s vote is the first element of the
triple within each node. As is evident from the figure, this player can distinguish
nodes ynn and nyy from the others however there remain two information sets
that each contain three nodes which of course the player can not distinguish be-
tween. Now, the information set consisting of three nodes where this player votes
y does not require any further analysis since the game ends after the first period,
conversely the tri-node information set where the player votes n and the game
continues demands further attention.
In line with information sets what is required at this point is this players beliefs in
the second period be outlined. This player must have beliefs µy and µn in the sec-
ond period. Since the only node that consists of both the first player voting y and
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Game Progresses to Second Period
Figure 4.1: The Game
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the second period being reached is within a singleton information set, the players
belief is trivially µy = 1. On the other hand, µn is slightly more complicated. De-
note the event E as the probability of the player being in the tri-node information
set where said player has voted n in the first period. It is straightforward to derive
the event probability E =
[
1− (1−F(c0))2
]
= F(c0) [2−F(c0)].
Having derived the event probability E this can be used in conjunction with Bayes
rule to yield the belief α = F(c0) [1−F(c0)]/E = [1−F(c0)]/ [2−F(c0)] as-
signed to node nny. Node nyn has of course the same belief attached to it with
nnn naturally having belief probability (1− 2α). Therefore, the players beliefs
in this instance are stated more precisely as µn(nny) = α , µn(nyn) = α and
µn(nnn) = 1−2α .
For use in later sections note that 2α = [2−2F(c0)]/ [2−F(c0)] whilst (1−
2α) = F(c0)/ [2−F(c0)].
4.4.1 Payoffs
As traditionally done, moving backward through the game enables a clearer un-
derstanding of the payoff construction. Hence the payoffs from playing 1 and 0
for an arbitrary type c at time t = 1 will be detailed first followed by the payoffs
from the identical action set for an arbitrary type c at time t = 0. In determining
the second period payoffs, the beliefs of the players are utilised at non-singleton
information sets such that the expected payoffs from playing 1 or 0 at time t = 1
can be calculated which will ultimately lead to finding expressions for the second
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period indifferent cost types. What follows are the payoffs from playing 1 and 0
at each information set in the second period. For the singleton node information
set ynn the payoff from playing 1 at time t = 1 for a type c is given by
−
[
q2n
(
Y
3
+
2Z
3
)
+2qn(1−qn)
(
Y
2
+
Z
2
)
+(1−qn)2Y
]
c
= −
(
1−qn+ q
2
n
3
)
Y c−
(
qn− q
2
n
3
)
Zc (4.4)
and the payoff from playing 0 at time t = 1 is given by
−(q2nZ+2qn(1−qn)Z)c+(1−qn)2S
= −(2qn−q2n)Zc+(1−qn)2S. (4.5)
For the other information set in the second period, the overall expected payoff
from playing 1 or 0 at time t = 1 arises as a weighted average of the payoffs
present at each node within the information set. In that respect, the beliefs that
the player holds over each node in this information set need to be incorporated
in order to calculate cn. Therefore, contingent on being at node nny or nyn, the
payoff from playing 1 at time t = 1 for a type c is
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−
[
qnqy
(
Y
3
+
2Z
3
)
+[qn+qy−2qnqy]
(
Y
2
+
Z
2
)
+(1−qn)(1−qy)Y
]
c
=−
(
1− qy
2
− qn
2
+
qnqy
3
)
Y c−
(qy
2
+
qn
2
− qnqy
3
)
Zc. (4.6)
The payoff from playing 0 is given by
− [(qnqyZ+[qn(1−qy)+qy(1−qn)]Z)c− (1−qn)(1−qy)S]
= − [(qn+qy−qyqn)Zc− (1−qn)(1−qy)S] . (4.7)
Finally, contingent on being at node nnn the payoff of playing 1 at time t = 1 for
a type c is given by
−
[
q2n
(
Y
3
+
2Z
3
)
+2qn(1−qn)
(
Y
2
+
Z
2
)
+(1−qn)2Y
]
c
= −
(
1−qn+ q
2
n
3
)
Y c−
(
qn− q
2
n
3
)
Zc (4.8)
with the equivalent expression for when 0 is played given by
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−[(q2nZ+2qn(1−qn)Z)c− (1−qn)2S]
= −[(2qn−q2n)Zc− (1−qn)2S] . (4.9)
Before proceeding to determine the first period payoffs, the expected payoffs of
the non-singleton information set need to be determined. Using the beliefs de-
tailed previously, the expected payoff from playing 1 at the non-singleton infor-
mation set where n is the first element of the triple is given by
−2α
[(
1− qy
2
− qn
2
+
qnqy
3
)
Y c+
(qy
2
+
qn
2
− qnqy
3
)
Zc
]
−(1−2α)
[(
1−qn+ q
2
n
3
)
Y c+
(
qn− q
2
n
3
)
Zc
]
. (4.10)
Whilst the expected payoff from playing 0 is given by
−2α [(qn+qy−qyqn)Zc− (1−qn)(1−qy)S]
−(1−2α)[(2qn−q2n)Zc− (1−qn)2S] . (4.11)
Having defined the second period payoffs, the payoffs from playing 1 and 0 at
time t = 0 for an arbitrary type c can be detailed. Firstly the payoff from playing
1 at time t = 0 for a type c is given by,
4.4. SOLUTION 37
−F(c0)2
{
qy
[(
1−qn+ q
2
n
3
)
Y c+
(
qn− q
2
n
3
)
Zc
]
+(1−qy)
[
(2qn−q2n)Zc− (1−qn)2S
] −S}− [1−F(c0)2]Xc
(4.12)
The payoff from playing 0 at time t = 0 is given by
− [1−F(c0)]2 Xc+
{
1− [1−F(c0)]2
}
[qn× (4.10)+(1−qn)× (4.11)+S]
(4.13)
4.4.2 Threshold Solutions
Given the payoffs for each of the information sets, attention can move to finding
the thresholds c0, cy and cn. Observe that these types simply express indifference
between playing 1 or 0 in their respective time periods. It follows that c j for
j = 0,y,n is hence obtained through setting the payoff from playing 1 equal to
that of playing 0 at the relevant information set in the game, however prior to
this, consider the equilibrium conjecture such that cn,cy ≤ c0. The reason for this
assumption is intuitive in the sense that if the second period is reached, it is quite
reasonable to think that the indifferent type lies closer to c, specifically ci ∈ [c,c0]
for i = y,n. This implies that qy = 1 and qn = [F(c0)−F(cn)]/ [F(c0)−F(c)]
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under the postulate. If the above inequality is strict, the indifferent cost type in
the first period c0, plays 1 with absolute certainty in the second period of the
game.
Observation 3. Given the conjecture that cn ≤ c0 which yields the form of qn
above, by construction c0 6= c. This means equilibria where c0 = c can be ruled
out a priori.
Using the implications above in conjunction with the first period payoffs, the first
period indifferent cost type c0, whilst due to the complexity of the function does
not have a closed form solution, is given by the following implicit function
−F(c0)2
{[(
1−qn+ q
2
n
3
)
Y c0+
(
qn− q
2
n
3
)
Zc0
]
−S
}
− [1−F(c0)2]Xc0
=
− [1−F(c0)]2 Xc0+
{
1− [1−F(c0)]2
}
[qn× (4.10)+(1−qn)× (4.11)+S]
(4.14)
Of course as it stands the above equality does not admit a straightforward eco-
nomic interpretation, however in the ensuing characterisation of equilibria and
under leniency permutations (4.14) concedes relevant policy considerations.
Now given the conjecture yields probability qy = 1, cy is in fact redundant since
any agent who plays 1 in the first period will with absolute certainty play 1 in the
second period. Hence cy can be fixed at the lower bound of the support c under
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the equilibrium conjecture.
On the other hand, in order to find cn, the expected payoff from playing 1 must
be set equal to the expected payoff from playing 0 at time t = 1 given 0 was the
action in the first period. Thus, setting (4.10) equal to (4.11) and using qy = 1
yields the following threshold value
cn =
(1−2α)(1−qn)2S
A
. (4.15)
Where
A = 2α
(
1
2
− qn
6
)
(Z−Y )
+(1−2α)
[(
qn− 2q
2
n
3
)
Z−
(
1−qn+ q
2
n
3
)
Y
]
.
As expected cn is contingent on parameters Z,Y and S. Equilibria of the model
will now be characterised using the above expressions for the indifferent cost
types.
Chapter 5
Equilibria
Having derived the threshold values under general specification of the model pa-
rameters, it is now prudent to examine the equilibria arising from said threshold
solutions. Furthermore, the equilibria of the model will allow for consideration
of different policy combinations by A . This can involve several different speci-
fications of the parameters at the disposal of A (X ,Y and Z) and whilst the pre-
vious thresholds maintain the solution to the problem in general form, in order to
achieve meaningful results the exact level of lenient treatment must be quantified.
Definition 3. An equilibrium is deemed interior if c < c0 < c and/or c < cn <
c0. Furthermore, if an equilibrium is not interior it is deemed a corner solution.
Recall that cy is redundant under the equilibrium conjecture.
The following considers equilibria arising when cn takes a corner value.
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5.1 Lower Bound Equilibria
To begin, consider the case when cn = c. In this situation all agents report under
L I at time t = 1.
Proposition 1. An equilibrium arises when cn takes the lower corner solution.
Specifically, cn = c = 0 and
c0 =
S
(1/3)Y +(2/3)Z−X . (5.1)
Proof. Since cn = c, qn = [F(c0)−F(c)]/ [F(c0)−F(c)] = 1. This reduces the
equation (4.14) to
−F(c0)2
[
1
3
Y c0+
2
3
Zc0−S
]
− [1−F(c0)2]Xc0
=
− [1−F(c0)]2 Xc0+F(c0) [2−F(c0)]
{
−
[
1
3
Y c0+
2
3
Zc0
]
+S
}
(5.2)
Rearranging the above the result follows. Finally, using qn = 1 in (4.15) gives
cn = 0.
Q.E.D
Remark 1. In keeping with the support of c0, X must be strictly less than
(1/3)Y +(2/3)Z so as to prevent infeasible thresholds.
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The result is rather intuitive in that every player will play 1 in the second period
and so the game will end in said period. Therefore, the surplus from success-
fully keeping the illegal activity undetected for one period is weighed against the
penalty differential between the two periods. The expected penalty in the second
period for a player is a weighted average of the possible penalties accruing to the
player, contingent on the probability of reporting first.
Hence to induce a larger number of firms to self-report under L C the authority
must maximise (1/3)Y +(2/3)Z−X . To render the analysis more concrete in a
practical sense further assume that there exists an exogenous upper penalty limit
K and an exogenous budget for the authority B such that X ∈ [−B,K ] and
Y,Z ∈ [0,K ]. An upper penalty limit concurs with legal restrictions on penalty
levels and/or public sentiment. Now, under this equilibrium the optimal policy
specification for the authority to induce corporate reports requires Z = Y =K
and X =−B. In words, penalties in the second period should be set equal at their
maximal values, whilst corporations should be offered the largest reward feasible
under the authority’s budget. Note that ifB = 0 it is optimal for A to set X = 0
in this equilibrium which corresponds to full corporate leniency.
In the view of the U.S. DoJ, eliciting corporate reports is the primary objective
of leniency programs. As was stated earlier the purpose of having individual
leniency operate concurrently to corporate leniency is to induce more corporate
applications because of the threat that individuals within the company will self-
report under L I . It seems, having observed this equilibrium under symmetric
access, that this idea should be taken with a grain of salt in that the potential
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attractiveness of L I may in fact prompt a decrease in corporate applications, as
F is a representative firm, and an increase in individual applications. Clearly, in
this instance as every agent is playing a strategy consisting of 1 in the second pe-
riod,L I becomes essentially redundant soA optimally sets Y = Z which means
there is no penalty concession for reporting individually. Observe however that
as the leniency parameter Y is decreased (makingL I more attractive) this moves
the first period indifferent threshold higher resulting in less corporate reports on
average which is exactly the opposite of the primary goal.
From the DoJ’s perspective the focus on inducing corporate leniency applications
as opposed to individual leniency applications most likely is due to informational
advantages. It most probably works in the favour of the DoJ having corporate
applicants both in an administrative sense in addition to learning about and sub-
sequently shutting down any illegal activity. In the model utilised the focus on
corporate leniency applications by the DoJ is mirrored in the benefit of garnering
first period reports since the illegal activity ends sooner hence less surplus from
misdemeanour is reaped by the agents inF .
Observation 4. Under symmetric access to leniency, players in the game com-
pare the relative merits of reporting under L C and L I . Specifically, a conse-
quence of having two competing leniency programs is that the relative penalty is
of interest as opposed to the absolute penalty size.
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5.2 Upper Bound Equilibria
Now consider the case where cn = c0. This corresponds to each agent playing
their initially chosen action in each period t = 0,1.
Proposition 2. Multiple equilibria arise when cn takes the upper corner solution
(cn = c0). Specifically, two equilibria come about, with the first having
F(c0) = F(cn) =
2(Y −Z)
2X−Y −3Z (5.3)
and the second having F(c0) = F(cn) = 1 which implies c0 = cn = c.
Proof. Since cn = c0, qn = [F(c0)−F(c0)]/ [F(c0)−F(c)] = 0. This reduces
equation (4.14) to
c0 =
F(c0) [2−F(c0)]S
2F(c0) [1−F(c0)] [Z−X ]−F(c0)2Y (5.4)
Whilst (4.15) reduces to
cn =
F(c0)S
[1−F(c0)] [Z−Y ]−F(c0)Y (5.5)
Setting (5.4) equal to (5.5) and manipulating yields a quadratic in terms of F(c0)
with roots 1 and 2(Y −Z)/(2X−Y −3Z).
Q.E.D
5.2. UPPER BOUND EQUILIBRIA 45
Remark 2. For Y 6= Z implicit in the first upper bound equilibrium is an interior
solution for c0. Note however that when Y = Z the payoff from reporting in the
first period is strictly greater than the payoff from not reporting ∀c.
The second upper bound equilibrium (F(c0) = F(cn) = 1) is trivial in the sense
that if the majority are playing 0 in the first period it does not matter whether an
individual agent plays 0 or 1 and since c0 = cn in this equilibrium, this follows
for the second period.
The non-trivial equilibrium expression does not have an interpretation as the sub-
ject is not c0 but rather the cumulative distribution function F . Note however that
this equilibrium entails all agents playing the same action in both periods and
so it is important to keep in mind that policy specification has exactly the same
effect on both indifferent thresholds.
Remark 3. As F is a cumulative distribution function it has support [0,1] which
entails restrictions on the parameter space such that Y ≤ Z to ensure F(.) ≥ 0
(note the denominator is always negative) and X ≤ (3/2)Y +(1/2)Z to ensure
F(.)≤ 1.
Now it is clear that the functional form of F in this equilibrium requires Y = Z as
the optimal policy specification. In accordance with the lower bound equilibrium,
these parameters are best set at the maximal permissable level, namely Y = Z =
K . However, when considering this upper bound equilibrium in isolation no
such direction regarding the optimal level of these parameters is given, though
when Y = Z = 0 it cannot be the case that X = 0 as the function is undefined. This
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is of particular relevance when A has no budget for rewards, B = 0, whereas if
rewards are possible no issue arises.
So to summarise, the lower bound equilibrium stipulates that optimal policy con-
struction requires X to be minimised, which corresponds to greater immunity and
possibly rewards under L C, and Y = Z = K . The upper bound equilibrium
stipulates that any optimal policy arrangement necessitates Y = Z, with certain
conditions on the parameter space when these are set to zero. It is clear that con-
sistency across equilibria demands X be minimised and parameters Y and Z be
set equal at the feasible maximum value for penalties.
What then are the ramifications in terms of having concurrently operating le-
niency programs? The conclusion reached above casts doubt on the merits of
individual leniency as a mechanism to generate increasing numbers of corpo-
rate reports since the optimal policy specification has Y = Z which corresponds
to granting absolutely no immunity to individuals whatsoever; identical to hav-
ing no individual leniency program but only corporate leniency on offer. Whilst
the U.S. DoJ championed the competition generated from having both individual
leniency and corporate leniency on offer as leading to an increase in corporate
reports due to the threat individual leniency posed, under symmetric access it ap-
pears as though this competition is working in the opposite direction. Namely,
individual leniency competes with corporate leniency for applications in that it
draws away reports underL C rather than promotes corporate reports.
In essence, there are two effects of interest in this analysis. Firstly, and what is
championed by the DoJ, is the threat effect the presence of individual leniency
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has on corporations. In addition, there is clearly an incentive effect taking place
in that incentives to report are reallocated when individual leniency is introduced
and as amnesty under L I is increased. With respect to self-reports under sym-
metric access to leniency, the presence of L I has the incentive effect dominate
the threat effect which is contrary to the assertion by the DoJ and results in a
suboptimal outcome.
Of particular interest is the special case where full leniency is offered. This being
a focal point in the literature concerning leniency makes it particularly relevant
for discussion in this study. Several full leniency arrangements are evaluated in
the forthcoming section.
5.3 Full Leniency
Full Individual Leniency. Firstly consider the case where Y = 0, which corre-
sponds to full leniency when reporting under L I . X and Z are left unspecified.
If, as per the U.S. DoJ, eliciting corporate reports is the primary objective, as was
shown previously full individual leniency is never an optimal policy specification
as the incentive to report underL I pulls agents away from reporting underL C.
However, if generating individual leniency reports is the main interest then it is
obvious that the optimal policy is reversed in that immunity underL I should be
made as generous as possible whilst to deter reports underL C, corporate reports
should be made as unattractive as possible so as to dampen the incentive effect
when access is symmetric.
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Full Corporate Leniency. Next consider the case where X = 0, which corre-
sponds to full leniency when reporting under L C. Y and Z are left unspecified.
Whether offering full immunity under L C is optimal is dependent upon the ex-
ogenous budget that A has at its disposal. Full corporate immunity is justified
in the case where rewards are not possible as a next best option, though it is im-
portant to note that A should strive to offer rewards to induce more corporate
reports.
Full Corporate and Individual Leniency. Perhaps the most practically com-
pelling case is where both corporate and individual leniency, when applied for,
grant full immunity to those who are self-reporting. In this context, both types of
leniency are offering the same level of indemnity to reporting agents. Whilst it
has been established that this policy specification is not ideal, it is meaningful to
discuss the ramifications of said policy as it is the most naturally occurring setup
a justice authority may consider. In fact recall that the U.S. DoJ defines leniency
as not charging entities criminally for the activity reported regardless of whether
the reporting party is an individual or a corporation which is roughly analogous to
offering both full corporate and individual leniency in this discussion. The result
where X = Y = 0 follows as a corollary from the above propositions.
Corollary 1. Under full corporate and individual leniency an equilibrium arises
where cn = c = 0 and c0 = 3S/2Z.
Proof. Immediate from using X = Y = 0 in Proposition 1. Q.E.D
Remark 4. Once again, under this equilibrium everyone plays a strategy which
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consists of action 1 in the second period whilst the first period indifferent type
is determined by the ratio of the surplus from illegal activity, 3S, to the penalty
accruing to two of the three agents inF .
Hence, whilst all reap the status-quo payoff S individually, one will be granted
full immunity under L I whilst her partners will be handed penalty Z. Though
offering both full corporate and individual leniency has been shown to be sub-
optimal, if this policy regime happens to be in place, to induce a greater number
of reports under L C the authority should set Z at its maximal value, namely
Z =K to maximise the likelihood of the total penalty outweighing the surplus
from illegal activity.
Corollary 2. Under full corporate and individual leniency an equilibrium arises
where cn = c0 with F(c0) = 2/3 = F(cn).
Proof. Immediate from using X = Y = 0 Proposition 2. Q.E.D
Remark 5. Under this equilibrium, the action played by each agent in both peri-
ods t = 0,1 is the same. Offering both full corporate and full individual leniency
achieves a suboptimal outcome again as the unique interior (respectively corner)
solution to c0 (resp. cn) is where F(c0) = 2/3 (resp. F(cn) = 2/3) which as a
result means the probability of the illegal activity progressing till the end of the
game is substantially higher than that of it ending via a self-report under either
L I or L C. Clearly, in this case offering full immunity under both types of le-
niency yields an unfavourable outcome for A as it renders the indifferent cost
types invariant to their other policy option Z.
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It can therefore be inferred that under symmetric access the current policy struc-
ture established by the U.S. DoJ is suboptimal in that having an individual le-
niency program operate concurrently with the corporate leniency program in the
first instance is not ideal or necessary to induce corporate reports, in addition to
specifying the absolute parameters at an inefficient level.
To better understand the movement of the indifferent thresholds in response to
changes in the parameter values, the next chapter deals with comparative statics.
Chapter 6
Comparative Statics
Consider the first period threshold solution c0 = S/ [(1/3)Y +(2/3)Z−X ] where
cn = c = 0 in the previous chapter. Interest lies in how c0 responds to changes in
the policy parameters of the system.
In this instance, the effect of changes in S, Y , Z and X need to be ascertained
though of course S lies outside the control of A . The total differential is dc0 =
∂c0
∂S dS+
∂c0
∂Y dY +
∂c0
∂Z dZ+
∂c0
∂X dX and it is clear that the effect of a change in a pa-
rameter of the system, holding all else constant, is given by the partial derivative
with respect to said parameter. Pursuant to this the partial derivatives are given
as follows. For S:
∂c0
∂S
=
1
(1/3)Y +(2/3)Z−X > 0 (6.1)
The denominator is positive when X < (1/3)Y + (2/3)Z which is in keeping
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with the support of c0. Adhering to expectations, an increase in S, the status-quo
payoff from committing the crime each period undetected, leads to an increase in
the threshold value of the first period indifferent type. In other words, this means
that on the average more agents will play 0 in the first period given this increase
in S. Now, taking the partial derivative with respect to Y :
∂c0
∂Y
=− (1/3)S
[(1/3)Y +(2/3)Z−X ]2 < 0 (6.2)
The negative sign concurs with the previous findings in that less immunity offered
underL I (Y is increased) decreases c0 which corresponds to more agents playing
1 in the first period, hence more corporate reports on average will be filed. Clearly
the presence of individual leniency has a dominant incentive effect that detracts
from corporate reports since if Y is decreased more agents will play 0 at time
t = 0 on average leading to less corporate reports. The effect of changes in Z:
∂c0
∂Z
=− (2/3)S
[(1/3)Y +(2/3)Z−X ]2 < 0 (6.3)
The partial derivative yields the expected sign as an increase in the penalty for
those who are finked on leads to, on average, more agents playing 1 in the first
period as there exist a greater expected penalty to each player if the second period
is reached.
∂c0
∂X
=
S
[(1/3)Y +(2/3)Z−X ]2 > 0 (6.4)
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Finally when immunity under corporate leniency is lessened (X is increased), this
leads to on average more agents playing 0 in the first period since reporting under
L C is not as attractive. Clearly as greater immunity is offered, and perhaps
rewards if feasible, this induces more agents to vote in the affirmative to file
a corporate report. In sum, the movement of c0 in response to changes in the
exogenous parameters of the model concur with expectations and further lend
weight to the findings drawn previously.
Before conducting comparative static analysis on the upper bound equilibrium
the cumulative distribution function F must be addressed explicitly. Observe that
the properties of the cumulative distribution function are such that F is monotone
non-decreasing in its argument as well as having lim
c→c F(c) = 0 and limc→c F(c) = 1
in this instance. Furthermore, F admits a first differentiable function f which
of course is the probability density function with the property that f (c) ≤ F(c).
Given these properties of F , consideration can now move to examining the im-
pact of variations in the exogenous parameters of the model in the upper bound
equilibrium.
Consider now the case where cn = c0 in the previous chapter. In this instance
c0 and cn are not explicitly known however F(c0) = F(cn) are used as proxies,
as per the properties of F detailed previously, in order to determine how the
indifferent cost types respond to changes in the policy parameters of the system.
In this discussion analysis is focused on c0 as c0 = cn the conclusions drawn for
c0 apply in the exact same manner to cn.
In this equilibrium, F(c0) = 2 [Y −Z]/ [2X−Y −3Z]. Letting x = F(c0), there-
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fore dx = f (c0)dc0 where f recall is the probability density function associated
with F . Hence, the total differential is dx= ∂F(c0)∂Y dY +
∂F(c0)
∂X dX+
∂F(c0)
∂Z dZ. Us-
ing the definition of dx this yields f (c0)dc0 =
∂F(c0)
∂Y dY +
∂F(c0)
∂X dX +
∂F(c0)
∂Z dZ.
Thus rearranging gives dc0 =
[
∂F(c0)
∂Y dY +
∂F(c0)
∂X dX +
∂F(c0)
∂Z dZ
]
/ f (c0).
Now to determine the impact of changes in Y , holding X and Z constant, set
dX = dZ = 0. The partial derivative with respect to Y : ∂F(c0)∂Y =
4[X−2Z]
[2X−Y−3Z]2 .
Therefore,
dc0
dY
=
4 [X−2Z]
[2X−Y −3Z]2 f (c0)
< 0 (6.5)
Which is the expected sign since X ≤ Z and is in accord with the lower bound
equilibrium result. For X , letting dY = dZ = 0 now and using the partial deriva-
tive with respect to X : ∂F(c0)∂X =
4[Z−Y ]
[2X−Y−3Z]2 yields
dc0
dX
=
4 [Z−Y ]
[2X−Y −3Z]2 f (c0)
> 0 (6.6)
Where once again the expected sign follows as Y ≤ Z. Finally, for Z setting dY =
dX = 0 and using the partial derivative with respect to Z:∂F(c0)∂Z =
4[2Y−X ]
[2X−Y−3Z]2
dc0
dZ
=
4 [2Y −X ]
[2X−Y −3Z]2 f (c0)
(6.7)
In keeping with the support of F(c0) in the upper bound equilibrium, it must
be that X ≤ (3/2)Y +(1/2)Z. For the derivative with respect to Z to yield the
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expected sign (negative) it must be the case that X ≥ 2Y . The two inequalities
infer that 2Y ≤ (3/2)Y +(1/2)Z which yields Y ≤ Z. Thus, the condition for
the expected sign is consistent with the restrictions on the parameter space of
the exogenous variables. Therefore, the comparative statics are consistent with
preconceived expectations in both equilibria.
Chapter 7
An Extension
Having established that under the earlier model specification the concurrent op-
eration of corporate and individual leniency programs is neither necessary nor
sufficient to induce greater numbers of corporate reports through the supposed
threat effect individual leniency has, an obvious question arises in that how does
one procure the opposite result. Namely, in what circumstances does individ-
ual leniency have a dominant threat effect thereby inducing a greater number of
corporate self-reports? Essentially, this revolves around the notion of creating a
tournament amongst players involved in the race for leniency through asymmetric
access to leniency programs.
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7.1 The Modified Model
Closer in line with Festerling (2005) it is now supposed that individual leniency
is only available to a subset of the firm F . Specifically, the firm contains a set
of owners Q = {1,2,3} and a set of operations managers M = {4} which in this
case is a singleton for ease of exposition. Thus the set of players in this modified
game is N =Q∪M where all agents in N are culpable for some continuing illegal
activity.
Similar to Festerling, L I is only available to managers whereas L C can be ap-
plied for by the owners on behalf of the firm as a whole. Hence, in this setup
owners only have the one avenue for immunity whereas managers directly have
the one, individual leniency, and indirectly through the owners have corporate
leniency. The players within F are assumed to be fully informed of this asym-
metry.
The authority A utilises the same leniency parameters as before, namely X , Y
and Z where recall these are the leniency parameters corresponding to corporate
leniency, successfully applying for individual leniency and the penalty for not
reporting (or failing to report first) where another has respectively. Recall that
X ,Y ≤ Z. The set of private cost types and the action set of each player is identical
to the previous model as is the cumulative distribution function F . What does
change is the timeline, the game play within time periods and the addition of an
exogenous detection probability for a more practical treatment to be described
shortly.
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In this setup, the game now has three periods. At time t = 0 the agents in Q
engage in a vote to determine whether or not to report underL C. If the firm does
not report at time t = 0, the game moves to the second period t = 1 where agent
four now has the option of self-reporting under L I or not. Players in Q only
move in the first period in accord with their having only L C at their disposal
and it is assumed for simplicity that the reporting behaviour of the manager is
independent of the executive vote in the first period. If player four chooses not to
report then the game continues to time t = 3 whereby no agent moves but rather
there now exist an exogenous probability p of the firm being detected by A .
Remark 6. In addition to being practically relevant, the inclusion of an exoge-
nous detection probability in the third period ensures that playing 1 is not strictly
dominated by playing 0 for agent four.
Observe that a strategy in this game for each player in N is simply σ such that σ :
[c,c] 7→ {0,1}. Thus, the strategy space for each agent in N is Ω= {σ | σ = σ}.
Finally, the payoffs are again best described in terms of the evolution of the game.
If the firm reports underL C at time t = 0 then every agent in N gets−Xci. If the
game is sustained till the second period and agent four reports underL I , players
in Q receive S−Zci whilst player four gets S−Y ci where recall S is the payoff
to each agent in N each period they go undetected. If though agent four does
not report at time t = 1 then the third and final period is reached where there is
probability p the firm will be detected by A in which case each player receives
2S−Zc. If the firm remains undetected, probability 1− p, then each agent keeps
the surplus 2S accrued to them. Without loss of generality, it is supposed that no
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surplus is reaped in the third period if the firm remains undetected so as to render
the analysis to come less cumbersome.
The solution concept in this instance takes the form
σ∗(c) =
 1 if c≥ ct0 if c < ct (7.1)
for t = 0,1. Where the subscript on the indifferent type follows from the fact that
the threshold solution at time t = 0 will be different to that at t = 1 due to the
asymmetry ascribed to the model.
7.2 Solution
Firstly, consider the expected payoffs to the players in Q, the owners. These play-
ers are symmetric and move in the first period and so correspond to the indifferent
type c0. The expected payoff from playing 1 in at time t = 0 for an arbitrary type
c is
F(c0)2 {F(c1) [S− pZc]+ [1−F(c1)] (−Zc)+S}−
[
1−F(c0)2
]
Xc (7.2)
whilst the expected payoff from playing 0 is
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− [1−F(c0)]2 Xc+
[
1− (1−F(c0))2
]×
{F(c1) [S− pZc]+ [1−F(c1)] (−Zc)+S}
(7.3)
Now consider agent four who moves at time t = 1. At time t = 1 the expected
payoff from playing 1 for an arbitrary type c is −Y c whilst the expected payoff
from playing 0 is S− pZc. The threshold solutions are hence obtained by equating
the relevant expected payoffs. For c0, the first period indifferent type, this is
defined by setting (7.2) equal to (7.3).
In order to obtain the result that individual leniency prompts greater numbers of
corporate reports rather than detracting from the number it needs to be the case
that a decrease in the parameter Y (greater immunity offered to self-reporting
managers) leads to on average more of the owners playing 1 in the first period
which corresponds to a decrease in c0.
Proposition 3. Under asymmetric access to leniency an increasing generosity in
the immunity level under the individual leniency program yields an increase in
the number of corporate self-reports.
Proof. To prove this requires dc1/dY > 0 and dc0/dc1 > 0. To begin, the second
period indifferent type is given by c1 = S/ [pZ−Y ]. Clearly,
dc1
dY
=
S
[pZ−Y ]2 > 0 (7.4)
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This satisfies the first requirement. Now, the first period indifferent type is given
by
c0 =
[1+F(c1)]S
[1+F(c1)(p−1)]Z−X (7.5)
The total derivative in this instance is given by dc0 =
∂c0
∂x dx+
∂c0
∂S dS+
∂c0
∂X dX +
∂c0
∂Z dZ where x = F(c1). Using the fact that dx = f (c1)dc1 and holding all ex-
ogenous parameters constant thus
dc0
dc1
=
S [(2− p)Z−X ] f (c1)
[X +(F(c1)(1− p)−1)Z]2
(7.6)
Which is positive since 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and X ≤ Z. Thus the second requirement is
satisfied and therefore when greater individual immunity is offered (Y decreased)
more agents in Q play 1 at time t = 0 on average. Since F is a representative
firm there will hence be more corporate reports on average.
Q.E.D
The result therefore lends weight to the potential usefulness of individual le-
niency operating concurrently to corporate leniency in order to elicit corporate
reports due to the threat effect. It is clear in this manifestation that the presence
of individual leniency creates a tournament between owners and managers due
to conflicting incentives provided by the leniency programs. What is required to
ensure this tournament exists is for A to make a clear distinction between who
can apply for what leniency program, essentially mechanically partitioning the
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firm in question.
Given asymmetric access is a necessary condition, the precise form of this asym-
metry in a practical sense would take the form of offering individual leniency
to non-owners, or the ‘little guys’ in a firm. This structure is the foundation for
the threat effect by creating competition internal to the firm that is legally cul-
pable. However, whilst under an asymmetric setup individual leniency is found
to be of merit with respect to generating corporate reports, the question remains
as to whether offering corporate and individual leniency does better than simply
offering corporate leniency in isolation.
Proposition 4. The authority A under asymmetric agent access is strictly better
off by offering corporate and individual leniency relative to offering only corpo-
rate leniency in isolation.
Proof. Observe that with only corporate leniency on offer, agents in M do not
take part in the game. Let c∗ denote the solution to the game with only corporate
leniency on offer. Note that having only corporate leniency on offer is equivalent
to A setting Y = Z and X < Z.
Now, consider the case where both leniency programs are offered. This means
that Y 6= Z and since Y is constrained such that Y ≤ Z it must be that Y < Z.
Let c′ denote the owners solution. As it has been shown that dc1/dY > 0 and
dc0/dc1 > 0 it must be that c′ < c∗ which means there are more corporate re-
ports on average and thereforeA is strictly better off offering both corporate and
individual leniency concurrently. Q.E.D
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It can therefore be said that if the individual leniency policy is structured in the
correct manner, with respect to access, then A is better off utilising the concur-
rent combination of the two leniency programs as opposed to just the one in the
circumstance whereby the focus is on generating corporate self-reports, as has
been the case in this thesis.
Chapter 8
Discussion and Implications
Having outlined the model, solved said model, conducted comparative statics
and provided an extension attention can move to discussion and summary of the
principle findings of this thesis, their alignment regarding the initial bureaucratic
assertion as well as their relation to previous studies.
What served to instigate this research was an assertion by the U.S. Department of
Justice whereby both corporate and individual leniency are concurrently offered.
The DoJ’s primary focus is on garnering corporate self-reports of illegal activities
with individual leniency mainly a means to achieve this goal. Accordingly, one of
the departments explanations for the recent increase in corporate self-reports was
in fact the presence of these two leniency programs where the individual leniency
program has a net threat effect that prompts more corporations to report before
an individual within said corporate does. In examining the validity of this claim,
this thesis has restricted attention to the interplay of agents within a firm thus
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bringing a more micro focused analysis to the issue of leniency. An offshoot of
this focus is uncovering agent behaviour within a firm under legal culpability in
addition to perhaps determining the optimal leniency structure to elicit corporate
reports from the point of view of a justice authority.
With these aims in mind several implications can now be drawn from this anal-
ysis. First and foremost it can be said that agent access to the relevant leniency
programs is imperative in determining the success of the concurrent operation of
said programs. Specifically, when agents within a firm are symmetric in their
access to leniency it was found that the presence of individual leniency actually
detracts from corporate reports which directly contradicts the primary aim of the
DoJ. The intuition for this result lies in the incentives of the agents. When ac-
cess to leniency is symmetric then there is no threat effect, as postulated by the
DoJ, but rather an incentive effect in operation. Players, now having two options
for leniency, simply weigh up the relative benefits of each program and submit
themselves under whichever offers greater immunity. Therefore, if individual le-
niency is attractive even in the slightest, this will detract from corporate reports
on average as more players switch programs. Moreover, with further increases in
individual immunity, this will result in more and more defectors from corporate
leniency. In this circumstance, there is no threat effect but rather a reallocation of
incentives to report for the agents concerned.
So when individual leniency is not restricted to certain agents within a firm it is
found to be suboptimal for an authority to offer any immunity under individual
leniency which is equivalent to having corporate leniency offered in isolation
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as the optimal policy specification. In light of this, the model was extended to
the case of asymmetric access to leniency. Specifically, individual leniency was
then only on offer to managers whilst owners could only report under corporate
leniency. With leniency prescribed in this fashion it was found that the presence
of individual leniency does in fact have a dominant threat effect on the owners
thereby supporting the DoJ’s contention. What is critical is this partitioning of
the firm by the authority with respect to leniency access and with this proviso the
combination of individual and corporate leniency was shown to do better than
corporate leniency in isolation with regard to eliciting corporate reports.
What then can be inferred with respect to the initial bureaucratic assertion? It
is clear that conditioned on asymmetric access within a firm the statement holds
true in that the presence of individual leniency does prompt greater numbers of
corporate reports. However, as stated previously the postulate only holds under
asymmetric access for under symmetric access to leniency programs within a firm
the opposite result eventuates in that the presence of individual leniency actually
detracts from corporate report numbers.
Hence two cases must be considered when broaching the arena of policy advice.
If for reasons such as legal or institutional, a justice authority can not restrict indi-
vidual leniency to a subset of the firm, usually consisting of lower down the chain
employees, then it is optimal to offer corporate leniency (at maximum allowable
immunity levels) in isolation and if possible go as far as rewards. Conversely,
if this restricted access is feasible then it is optimal for the justice authority to
offer both corporate and individual leniency concurrently. A potential means to
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achieve this asymmetry would perhaps be an amendment clause in the individual
leniency policy which stipulates that only non-owners are capable of accessing
the program.
It may seem as though imposing this restriction diminishes the sources of infor-
mation to the justice authority by disbanding potential singleton reporting owners
from individual leniency, however this is a necessary trade-off as the increased
threat effect from this restriction will induce more corporate reports which in turn
is associated with better information acquisition for the authority.
The connotations for justice authorities come back to determining causality with
respect to policy administration. Whilst it is straightforward to derive conclu-
sions from a simple observation regarding for example a variable trend perhaps,
authorities must be aware of the Lucas (1976) critique. In this case the poten-
tial reactions and adjustments of economic agents subject to the leniency policies
must be taken into account. This agent behaviour is demonstrated clearly under
symmetric leniency access as agents, due to the presence of individual leniency,
substitute away from corporate leniency as a consequence of a redistribution of
incentives to report. This illustrates that as per the Lucas critique, drawing infer-
ence from historical data regarding the effect of a policy or change in policy is at
best a risky proposition.
Having established this policy manifesto it is prudent to consider the policy setup
of the U.S. Department of Justice. As per the institutional requisites outlining
the two leniency policies, it appears to be the case that the individual leniency
program is not restricted to particular persons within a firm but rather open to all
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individuals who seek to approach the department as a singleton. Drawing upon
the findings in this thesis this arrangement is not optimal in general and certainly
contravenes the stated intention of the DoJ to glean corporate self-reports.
With respect to previous literature, namely Festerling (2005), there is both a con-
trast and an overlap in results though for the most part the avenues taken to anal-
yse the interdependence of corporate and individual leniency are quite disparate.
Festerling’s analysis from the onset partitions the firm into managers and owners
thus immediately pandering to the asymmetric outcome.
One of the principle findings of Festerling is that individual leniency applications
are never observed when both corporate and individual leniency programs are in
concurrent operation. This stands in contrast with the results in this thesis due
to the exclusion (respectively inclusion) of incomplete information in Festerling
(resp. this thesis) since here in both the symmetric and asymmetric instances if
an agents cost type is sufficiently high, she will report under a leniency program
with the precise choice dependent upon agent access and relative attractiveness of
the programs. If agent access is symmetric and individual leniency is sufficiently
attractive (recall this is not optimal but instead illustrates a point) agents will
report as individuals. Under asymmetric access, a manager can and is the only
one who can report under individual leniency and will do so if her cost is high
enough. Thus the proposition in Festerling stipulating that individual leniency
applications are never observed is one not mirrored in this exposition.
Nevertheless, the results in this thesis in the asymmetric case do lie in accord with
Festerling with respect to supporting the DoJ’s postulate, viz. that the presence
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of individual leniency does prompt greater numbers of corporate reports. Beyond
these points however, the underlying structure of the models in Festerling and
this thesis diverge in both their construction and application thereby precluding
any meaningful comparison beyond that already made. What serves as significant
validation though is the congruence of results under similar assumptions (asym-
metry in leniency access) notwithstanding the disparity regarding the observation
of individual leniency applications.
Similar to though not nearly as negative a result as Spagnolo (2000b) and Buc-
cirossi and Spagnolo (2006) is the importance of ensuring the leniency pro-
gram(s) setup is proper and in line with the primary goals of the justice author-
ity. Whilst said previous papers found improperly setup leniency programs to be
pro-collusive, the results here highlight the fact that the structure of each of the
leniency programs in question, if incorrectly specified, may lead to a suboptimal
outcome when the aim is to elicit corporate self-reports.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
Having concluded the analysis with specific determination of leniency structure
and effect, the overarching conclusions are the following. Firstly, the U.S. DoJ’s
assertion is in need of qualification and only holds conditionally in that agent
access to leniency is paramount in determining the success of leniency program
concurrency. Secondly, in line with the Lucas critique of policymaking, there is
a need for authorities to be fastidious with respect to cause and effect of their
policies. With these in mind, the field of leniency and more generally corporate
malfeasance is one that is highly receptive to differing research agendas given its
direct practicality and relevance to the realm of the political economy. There are
several potential extensions to this research that can be made.
What immediately comes to the forefront of thought is perhaps making further
use of the probability of detection. In the modified model an exogenous detection
probability exists in the last period of the game. One could perhaps incorporate
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this detection probability into every period of the game however the usefulness
of this remains to be seen. Intuitively, all an exogenous probability of detection
serves to do is in effect scale down the payoff from engaging in illegal activity
thus most likely leaving the principle results from this analysis unchanged. Nev-
ertheless, an interesting extension could endogenise the probability of detection
such that it is contingent on the type and/or scale of illegal activity. A similar
potential inclusion are damage payments after prosecution, however this in all
probability will work much the same way as the detection probability in simply
scaling down the illegal surplus.
Moving toward the angle of previous literature, cartel activity can be focused
on explicitly. Cartel activity being a focal point in the literature, it would be of
relevance to embed the firm in oligopolistic competition. This extension would
thus render the firm susceptible to competition for leniency both internally and
externally. Whilst yielding a more practical treatment of the problem the focus
in such an endeavour would be pulled away from the interplay of corporate and
individual leniency, which has been the principle matter in this thesis, and rather
focused on the usual culprit of cartels. This though would be of substantial merit
as leniency programs are primarily in existence as an avenue to terminate car-
tel activity, however for the purposes of analysing corporate versus individual
leniency examining cartels explicitly was not necessary in this research.
In this exposition it has been assumed that agents are identical with respect to
the surplus they command, essentially being a special case of every agent hav-
ing equal bargaining power. Incorporating a bargaining stage where bargaining
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power is derived from the cost type (lower cost types having more bargaining
power) or position within the firm could very well alter the result under the case
of symmetric access to leniency. The division of the illegal surplus could be ac-
complished by virtue of the Shapely value which would precisely represent the
bargaining power of agents. Given this, the threat of higher cost players who re-
ceive very little of the surplus could nullify the incentive effect under symmetric
access and further support the conjecture at the root of this thesis, though this
may not be true as the reason symmetric access renders concurrent operation of
programs ineffective is precisely because every agent has the option to report un-
der either program. Under asymmetric access, the unequal division of surplus
would most probably serve to amplify the already dominant threat effect.
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